World Nuclear Report Reveals $4.4 Billion in Overruns and Major Defects in Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in Korea
A World Nuclear Expert Report revealed $4.4 billion in overruns and major defects in the construction of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in Korea in 2020, but Korean media did not mention it.
The World Nuclear Industry Qualification Report (WNISR) reported on August 21, 2020, in its report titled <Barakah, UAE: Grid Connection of the Arab World’s First Commercial Nuclear Reactor> that “the project has experienced several delays and concerns have been raised over the past few years regarding design safety, staff training, security, and proliferation impacts.” In 2009, ENEC (the Emirates Nuclear Energy Authority) announced that “the contract for the construction, commissioning, and fuel load of the four units is approximately $20 billion, with a high percentage of the contracts being awarded under fixed-price contracts.” However, it was later revealed that the total cost of the project was at least $24.4 billion. “It was reported that the overpayment of $4.4 billion was concealed.”
The original financing plan for the project was $10 billion from the Export-Import Bank of Korea, $2 billion from the Export-Import Bank of the United States, $6 billion from the Abu Dhabi government, and $2 billion from commercial banks.
In particular, the report stated that regarding the multiple delays in the construction plan, “Barakah-1, which officially began construction in Korea on July 19, 2012, proposed that commercial operation would begin in May 2017, and as recently as October 2016, Korean media reported that Unit 1 was scheduled for completion in May 2017, but in March 2018, it was reported that Unit 1 would be operational ‘possible in 2019,’ and just a few months later, in July 2018, a new delay was announced, stating that ‘Unit 1 would be operational in late 2019 or early 2020,’ and commercial operation would not take effect until 2020, which is three years later than scheduled.” The report continued, “Despite the delay, an official ceremony was held on March 26, 2018 to mark the completion of the first reactor construction, and the main reasons for the delay appear to be the lack of trained personnel and cultural and linguistic diversity among new employees,” and stated that the “completion ceremony” was held at South Korea’s request before the completion.
The report stated that the defect in South Korea’s construction “was manifested in the form of ‘voids’ discovered in the containment concrete of Units 2 and 3, and while it is unclear how large these voids are, they are similar to those experienced at the Hanbit reactor in Yeonggwang, South Jeolla Province, in the 1990s, which exposed holes large enough for a child to fit through.” “The problem was discovered after grease migrated into the voids, causing protrusions in the concrete to form and settle in cracks near the outer wall, and the grease is used to lubricate and reinforce the adjustable metal cables that pass through the containment wall.”
The report noted that regarding the Unit 2 defects, “There have been conflicting reports of cracks being found in the containment building of Unit 2 and similar cracks being found in the containment building of Unit 3,” and that “even if these were easily repaired, this discovery raises two concerns. First, the containment building is a critical barrier to preventing a potential radioactive release in the event of an accident, and second, this is another sign that construction has not proceeded as smoothly as ENEC had proposed.” The report said that the South Korean APR 1400 design “presents additional challenges due to issues with the reactor’s pilot-operated safety relief valve (POSRV),” which is designed to protect the reactor from overpressurization. “It was discovered to be defective after the pressurizer accidentally opened during operation of South Korea’s Shin-Kori 3 in 2016, causing a cooling water leak. Then in November 2017, the same problem occurred during testing at Barakah Unit 1, resulting in regulators saying the valve did not meet safety approval criteria.”
The South Korean government, KHNP, and the South Korean media have not commented on the incident.
Recognizing the scale of the ongoing problem, the report said that EDF signed a contract with ENEC on 22 November 2018 to provide services to support the “operations and maintenance” of the plant. <EDF, “EDF and Nawah Energy Company Sign Operation and Maintenance Support Contract for Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in the United Arab Emirates”, November 22, 2018>
The Czech government stated in a press release at the time of selection, “We have fixed dates and clearly defined schedules for the start and completion of construction,” and “It is important for us that the contractor commits to this, and in this respect, the preferred bidder’s proposal was more satisfactory.”
In their proposal, the Korean government and KHNP presented the Czech Republic with the strategy of “on time & within budget,” and Korean media outlets unanimously reported, “The ‘K-Nuclear Power Plant’s’ guarantee that large-scale nuclear power plant construction can be carried out on time and within budget in the most economical and rapid manner has once again proven effective in the global market.”
On July 17, Korean media outlets reported in unison that “the recent meeting between President Yoon Seok-yeol and Czech President Petr Pavel had a major impact,” and that “President Yoon cited the UAE Bacarra nuclear power plant project as an example, emphasizing the effects of ‘on-time delivery,’ ‘construction costs,’ and ‘technology transfer.’”
See <Czech nuclear power plant secret letter upgraded, Bacarra nuclear power plant 25% ‘additional’ Yoon Seok-yeol ‘contractor,’ July 23, 2024>