New Iran-Russia-China Cartel to Dismantle US Dominance, 'Iran to Become the 4th Strongest Power'
An American political scientist has predicted that the Iran war will dismantle the system of absolute US dominance and transition into a new oil cartel distribution route system involving Russia, China, and Iran, thereby propelling Iran to become the world's "fourth strongest power."
Robert A. Pape, a political science professor at the University of Chicago, stated that the United States stands at a crossroads regarding whether to commit to efforts to regain long-term control over the Strait of Hormuz or to accept a new global energy system where US control is no longer guaranteed. He noted that if the US chooses to accept the new system, "the outcome is clear: the international system will be reorganized, and Iran will become the fourth center of world power. However, if the US decides to re-establish military control, a long struggle will ensue, and it could be defeated."
**Iran to Be the 4th Strong Power** Professor Pape diagnosed Iran’s “entry into becoming the fourth superpower,” stating, “Control is possible without closing the strait.” He noted that “crude oil must be supplied on time, in large quantities, and with predictable risks; if that reliability collapses, the insurance market tightens, transportation rates skyrocket, and governments begin to view energy access not as a simple market transaction, but as a complex strategic challenge.”
He stated that a global shift is taking place from the “Russia-China-Iran trio cartel” to an “incentive strategy framework,” and that the U.S. stands at a crossroads where it may lose the war to regain control, or must adopt a strategy that accepts this outcome.
In particular, he assessed that unless the U.S. stations military forces in the strait due to the triggering of a war with Iran, it is impossible to re-secure oil distribution routes.
Facing the choice of “re-bombing the war,” President Trump specifically singled out “South Korea” and “Japan”—countries subordinate to the existing order of domination—and announced a “dependency confirmation regime” on the 6th.
Despite the inability to rapidly reconfigure refineries, transportation routes, and storage systems—which represent a "long-standing dependency inherent in infrastructure"—President Lee Jae-myung is repeating his "strategy to secure crude oil contracts with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kazakhstan" on the 6th by relying on a strategy of expanding existing dependencies through the "dispatch of presidential special envoys."
During a Cabinet meeting on the 6th regarding the "drone infiltration incident into North Korea," President Lee stated, "Although it was not our government's intention, I express my regret to the North for the unnecessary military tension caused by the irresponsible and reckless actions of some." He further noted, "The Constitution and laws of the Republic of Korea prohibit individuals from privately provoking the North," thereby directly linking North Korea to the Trump administration rather than reinforcing the existing "strategy to facilitate a North Korea-US summit under the Trump administration."
A column by Professor Paper, a researcher of military strategy and international security, diagnosing the changing landscape of international politics, was published in the New York Times on the 6th under the title *War Is Making Iran a Major World Power*. The following is the full text.
For the past few years, the conventional geopolitical view has been that the world order is shifting toward a three-power center consisting of the United States, China, and Russia. This perspective assumed that power stems primarily from economic scale and military strength.
That assumption no longer holds true. Iran is rapidly emerging as a fourth global power center that is economically and militarily incomparable to these three nations. Instead, this country's new power stems from its control of the Strait of Hormuz, the most critical energy bottleneck in the global economy.
This strait has long been an international waterway through which ships from all nations can pass. However, the joint military operation launched against Iran by the United States and Israel this year has prompted Iran to establish a selective military blockade of the strait.
Approximately one-fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas supply passes through this strait. In the short term, there are no practical alternatives to this supply route. If Iran's control of the strait persists for months or years, it will dramatically reshape the global order to the disadvantage of the United States. Many analysts believe that Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz is merely temporary. The widespread expectation is that the U.S. and allied navies will soon stabilize the situation, and oil flows will resume along familiar routes.
That expectation is incorrect. It assumes that Iran must physically blockade the strait to maintain control. However, as we have already seen, control can be maintained without closing the strait. Today, the strait remains open to oil tankers.
Traffic volume has dropped by more than 90% since the war began, not because Iran sank every vessel entering the strait, but because insurers withdrew or recalculated war risk insurance in light of the actual threat of attack. Striking cargo ships every few days was enough to make the risk unacceptable.
The modern economy does not simply need oil. Furthermore, crude oil must be supplied on time, in large quantities, and with predictable risks. When that reliability collapses, insurance markets tighten, shipping rates skyrocket, and governments begin to view energy access not as a simple market transaction, but as a complex strategic challenge. The problem with the United States is asymmetry.
Protecting all oil shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz from potential attacks—landmines, drones, and missiles—is a full-time operation. It requires a continuous military presence. Even if Iran attacks oil tankers only occasionally, it can cast doubt on the reliability of global oil shipments.
French President Emmanuel Macron said this on Thursday, declaring that opening the Strait of Hormuz by force is "unrealistic" and that "this is only possible with cooperation with Iran." He effectively admitted that oil supplies cannot be guaranteed without Iran's consent.
For decades, the Persian Gulf maintained a simple system: oil-producing nations exported, the market set prices, and the United States secured the routes. That system enabled competition without instability. But now, it is collapsing.
Gulf nations rely heavily on energy exports for their national revenue.
When insurance premiums skyrocket and shipping becomes uncertain, the financial impact is immediate.
Governments make adjustments. Cargo is rerouted. Contracts are renegotiated.
If uncertainty persists, the Gulf Agreement will inevitably change and be replaced by a different regional order that increasingly accommodates the actor capable of having the most direct impact on export credibility. That actor is now Iran.
Global consequences will be most pronounced in Asia.
Japan, South Korea, and India are heavily dependent on Gulf energy. While China is more diversified, it relies on this region for a significant portion of its energy imports.
This dependence is inherent in the infrastructure. Refinery, transport routes, and storage systems cannot be reconfigured quickly.
If disruptions to the energy supply continue, the impact will be far-reaching. Prices will rise as insurance premiums and transport costs increase. The trade balance will deteriorate. The currency will weaken. Inflation will rise. Energy dependency will begin to influence policy-making.
Governments will prioritize energy access. Diplomatic options will narrow. Actions that risk causing further instability will become more difficult to sustain. The world of the 1970s, marked by oil shocks leading to years of stagflation, will no longer be a distant memory but an approaching reality.
Again, Iran will benefit.
China relies on Gulf energy to sustain its growth. Russia benefits from higher and more volatile energy prices. Iran holds the upper hand at the Strait of Hormuz bottleneck.
Each of these three countries possesses incentives that run counter to the economic stability of the United States and its allies. These three nations are in a relationship that does not require formal cooperation.
The structure of the system pushes them in the same direction. This is how a new order emerges.
Not through formal alliances (at least initially), but through converging incentives that reinforce one another over time.
Other plausible scenarios in a new world order are much bleaker. Imagine Iran controlling about 20% of the world's oil, Russia about 11%, and China absorbing a significant portion of that supply. They will form a cartel to seize 30% of the world's oil from the West. It requires no sophisticated analysis to recognize the fatal consequences: the rapid decline of power in the U.S. and Europe, and a global shift toward China, Russia, and Iran.
The United States faces a difficult choice: commit to efforts to regain long-term control of the Strait of Hormuz, or accept a new global energy regime where U.S. control is no longer guaranteed.
If it chooses acceptance, the outcome is clear: the international system will be reorganized, and Iran will become the fourth center of world power. However, if the United States decides to re-establish military control, a long struggle will ensue, and it may end in defeat.
A war with Iran is not a military conflict where the United States simply backs down and returns to the past. Iran will demand a heavy price for a new agreement with the United States, but this price will be far less than the alternative future.
This is a transformative war, and if these changes persist for just a few years, the world order will be irreversibly altered.
See <Trump's Power-Based Iran War: Failure of 'Submission' Replaced by 'Increased Costs', Iran Gains the 'Seize', April 4, 2026>
<Macron 'Defense Arms Cooperation', Lee Jae-myung 'Nuclear Cooperation', Takaichi 'Multilateralism', April 3, 2026>
<Trump War: 'Investing in Children's Future Ahead of Schedule', Lee Jae-myung Stock Market: 'Investing Ahead', April 2, 2026>
<US-Israel Joint Iran War: Constant Threat Exposure, Diverse Diplomacy 'Defeat', March 24, 2026>
<Mossad 'Incites Uprising' in Iran, Netanyahu War: Trump's Initiation 'Failure', March 23, 2026>
<Trump Loses Control Over Iran War Conflict, Israeli Nuclear Facility Air Defenses Penetrated, March 22, 2026>
<Iran's Multi-Layered Power: 'US Suffering Damage' from Prolonged Asymmetry in a Long-Term War>
<European Government Report on ‘Accumulation’, Dated March 6, 2026>
<Patriot ‘Limits’ to Drone Attack Capability Against Iran’s ‘Attack’ on Israel’s Dimona Nuclear Facility, Dated March 5, 2026>